If we have the face of a criminal, should we be banned from trying to match it?

https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/07/20/1076539/face-recognition-massachusetts-test-police/

The movement to limit face recognition tech might finally get a win

… The state’s lawmakers are currently thrashing out a bipartisan state bill that seeks to limit police use of the technology. Although it’s not a full ban, it would mean that only state police could use it, not all law enforcement agencies.

… Law enforcement agencies in the state were now permitted access only to face recognition systems owned and operated by the Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV), the state police, or the FBI. As a result, the universe of photos that police could query was much more limited than what was available through a system like Clearview, which gives users access to all public photos on the internet.

To hunt for someone’s image, police had to submit a written request and obtain a court order. That’s a lower bar than a warrant, but previously, they’d just been able to ask by emailing over a photo to search for suspects in misdemeanor and felony offenses including fraud, burglary, and identity theft.

Wow! One whole hour!

https://www.databreaches.net/attorneys-on-alert-for-cybersecurity-threats-new-yorks-new-cle-training-requirement/

Attorneys on alert for cybersecurity threats: New York’s new CLE training requirement

John Bandler reports:

July 1st was a cybersecurity milestone for every New York attorney who now needs to complete an hour of cybersecurity training before renewing their law license. New York Courts in their role supervising and licensing attorneys recognize the importance of cybersecurity, and the threat of cybercrime.

Cybercrime menaces every person and organization including attorneys, law firms and their clients. Attorneys have specialized duties that translate to cybersecurity obligations in addition to the general obligations that apply to other professions and sectors.

Read more at Reuters.

Could be interesting. What conclusions?

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4507244

The Future of Cybercrime: AI and Emerging Technologies Are Creating a Cybercrime Tsunami

This paper reviews the impact of AI and emerging technologies on the future of cybercrime and the necessary strategies to combat it effectively. Society faces a pressing challenge as cybercrime proliferates through AI and emerging technologies. At the same time, law enforcement and regulators struggle to keep it up. Our primary challenge is raising awareness as cybercrime operates within a distinct criminal ecosystem. We explore the hijacking of emerging technologies by criminals (CrimeTech) and their use in illicit activities, along with the tools and processes (InfoSec) to protect against future cybercrime. We also explore the role of AI and emerging technologies (DeepTech) in supporting law enforcement, regulation, and legal services (LawTech).

I need to think about this one…

http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/DEON00004.pdf#page=334

Inconsistent precedents and deontic logic

Computational models of legal precedent-based reasoning developed in the field of Artificial Intelligence and Law are typically based on the simplifying assumption that the background set of precedent cases is consistent. Besides being unrealistic in the legal domain, this assumption is problematic for recent promising applications of these models to the development of explainable Artificial Intelligence methods. In this paper I explore a model of legal precedent-based reasoning that, unlike existing models, does not rely on the assumption that the background set of precedent cases is consistent. The model is a generalization of the reason model of precedential constraint. I first show that the model supports an interesting deontic logic, where consistent obligations can be derived from inconsistent case bases. I then provide an explanation of this surprising result by proposing a reformulation of the model in terms of cases that support a new potential decision and cases that conflict with it.

Before you answer…

https://www.proquest.com/openview/c1a5c93054c97da9f3f79dce5b86e666/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y

Is Wide-Area Persistent Surveillance by State and Local Governments Constitutional?

This dissertation addresses the following question: “Can wide-area persistent surveillance (WAPS) developed by the United States military and employed abroad as a tool in the Global War on Terror be employed domestically as a law enforcement tool without violating the US Constitution’s Fourth Amendment?” The most likely and controversial application of WAPS by state and local governments is for law enforcement. Aircraft will loiter over a city persistently taking high-definition photographs to capture locations of unidentified persons with the intent to identify persons and areas of interest for criminal investigations. Based on the Flyover Cases, aerial surveillance has few constitutional limitations which WAPS can be consistent. The key challenge in determining the constitutionality of WAPS depends on the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment concerning emerging technologies. Legal scholars have suggested various forms of the Mosaic Theory, which was introduced in two concurring opinions in Jones v. United States. The Supreme Court has been reticent to engage new technology’s constitutionality. WAPS is among the less intrusive tools when compared to other emerging technologies like digital information or facial recognition. This research argues why the Courts should view Personal Identifying Information (PII) as the line of reasonable expectations of privacy for WAPS and other emerging technologies. Aerial surveillance by nature, collects passive information, new data is not being created by photographing the happenings in public spaces from an aerial platform. In Carpenter v. United States, the Court ruled that warrantless surveillance of cell site location information (CSLI) for more than seven days was an unreasonable search. However, the court repeatedly referred to CSLI as “unique,” whereas “conventional surveillance and tools, such as security cameras,” are not. WAPS should not be limited by the Constitution for the operational duration, time of day/night, camera resolution, location of collection, altitude, or any other variable at the collection stage of the operations. The analysis and exploitation of WAPS data encounters constitutional limits necessary to protect individuals’ PII absent probable cause standards.