This should be easy to program. Where would you like the money sent?
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123049572
Airman loses $600 to '1-cent deposit' scam
by Staff Sgt. Don Branum 50th Space Wing Public Affairs
4/19/2007 - SCHRIEVER AIR FORCE BASE, Colo. (AFNEWS) -- An Airman assigned to the 50th Mission Support Squadron here recently fell victim to a new banking scam against which vigilance is the only defense.
Airman A, whose full name has been withheld for privacy reasons, first noticed the scam when money began disappearing from his account at a local bank.
"I'm not usually the type of person who checks his account balances every day," Airman A said. "I called the bank recently to find out my balance, and the amount in the account was lower than I'd expected."
More specifically, the account balance was $124.90 less than it should have been. A business named "Equity First" had made the debit. The toll-free number listed on the transaction led to dead ends -- none of the options would allow Airman A to speak with a human. So he went online.
"I searched for information, and the result that came up was for a mortgage company," said Airman A, who lives in one of the Schriever Air Force Base Airmen's dormitories on Peterson AFB. He found a toll-free number on that site and called.
Joanna Thorndyke is an employee at the mortgage company Airman A contacted. Equity 1st Mortgage, based in Wilmington, N.C., is not the "Equity First" making the withdrawals, but company employees have fielded dozens of complaints since the scam began.
"We've had people calling from all over the country except North Carolina -- the only state in which we're licensed to do business," Mrs. Thorndyke said.
She has handled approximately 100 phone calls from scam victims since at least 2006, including five calls she received April 1. In every case, the amount withdrawn was the same: $124.90.
The scammers apparently generate random routing and account numbers, into which they try to deposit one cent, Mrs. Thorndyke said. Once the one-cent deposit clears, the perpetrators know the account is active and begin to withdraw funds from the account.
Based on the call traffic, Mrs. Thorndyke said the withdrawals seemed to take place near the beginning of the month. Some people had only seen a single withdrawal from their accounts. In Airman A's case, however, the perpetrator had struck several times. His total loss was more than $600.
"We've contacted everyone we can in our state to clear our name," Ms. Thorndyke said. "We hate that our name's associated with something like this, but we're letting victims know that they need to contact their banks."
Airman A contacted his bank, the Peterson AFB branch of 5-Star Bank. Vickie DuVal, the bank manager, refunded the amounts and recommended Airman A open a new bank account to stop the fraudulent withdrawals.
"This was the first time I'd seen this," Ms. DuVal said.
Because the transfers clear electronically, people are not asked to verify the transactions. However, they may dispute the transactions once they notice what's happening.
Logical, but nasty. Perhaps a smart bomb or six would solve the problem?
http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/#00001175
Military Targets
Posted by Sean @ 08:07 GMT
In our recent examination of Banker Keyloggers and Phishing sites we're noticing a growing trend. "Military" banks.
Why target banks that cater to U.S. military personal? Our guess is with the increased deployment of U.S. Military personal around the world, they've becoming an interesting target for the bad guys. If you're away from home – you'll do your banking online.
No rush, they probably already know they're victims...
http://www.out-law.com/page-7976
Details of 100,000 Bulldog customers stolen
OUT-LAW News, 19/04/2007
The private details of 100,000 internet users have been stolen from broadband provider Bulldog. The security breach happened when the company was owned by Cable & Wireless.
The data was stolen from Cable & Wireless in December 2005 by a third party which the company believes it can identify. Bulldog's customer base has since been sold to broadband provider Pipex, but C&W is investigating the breach.
James Brown, managing director of Bulldog Internet, told the Guardian newspaper: "Our understanding is that, following an external enquiry by Cable & Wireless, it has become apparent that at some point in December 2005 Cable & Wireless had some of their customer contact details illegally obtained by a third party. This resulted in a small number of their customers receiving unsolicited calls."
C&W said that it was preparing legal action against a third party which it said could be the source of the leak.
It is not yet clear exactly what customer data was taken. Several customers have reported receiving telephone calls that alerted them to the security breach. It is not known whether or not credit card or bank details were among those taken. C&W said that there was no evidence that that was the case.
Small and contained?
http://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/60444.html
Personal data of NMSU students posted online
By ASSOCIATED PRESS April 19, 2007
LAS CRUCES, N.M. (AP) - The names and Social Security numbers of more than 5,600 New Mexico State University students were accidentally posted on the school's Web site, but officials say odds are minimal that any students' identities were compromised.
The information was in a public section of the site for nearly two hours on April 5 before the mistake was caught.
The file was accessed by 14 computers and all of their IP addresses have been tracked, said Mrinal Virnave, NMSU's director of enterprise application services.
Virnave said the file contained the names and Social Security numbers of students who registered online to attend their commencement ceremonies from 2003 to 2005, meaning most of the names and numbers are of former students.
What's happening to my warm fuzzy feeling?
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070419/ap_on_hi_te/hackers_state_department
State Department got mail _ and hackers
By TED BRIDIS, Associated Press Writer Wed Apr 18, 8:29 PM ET
A break-in targeting State Department computers worldwide last summer occurred after a department employee in Asia opened a mysterious e-mail [This isn't the 'Twilight Zone' Bob] that quietly allowed hackers inside the U.S. government's network.
In the first public account revealing details about the intrusion and the government's hurried behind-the-scenes response, a senior State Department official described an elaborate ploy by sophisticated international hackers. They used a secret break-in technique [Just because you don't know who Sponge Bob is, doesn't make him a secret Bob] that exploited a design flaw in Microsoft software.
Consumers using the same software remained vulnerable until months afterward.
Donald R. Reid, the senior security coordinator for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, also confirmed that a limited amount of U.S. government data was stolen [“Any” is too much, “limited” is way too much Bob] by the hackers until tripwires severed all the State Department's Internet connections throughout eastern Asia. The shut-off left U.S. government offices without Internet access in the tense weeks preceding missile tests by North Korea.
Reid was scheduled to testify Thursday at a cybersecurity hearing for a House Homeland Security subcommittee. He was expected to tell lawmakers an employee in the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs — which coordinates diplomacy in countries including China, the Koreas and Japan — opened a rigged e-mail message in late May giving hackers access to the government's network.
... The department struggled with the break-ins between May and early July.
... The State Department detected its first break-in immediately, Reid said, and worked to block suspected communications with the hackers. But during its investigation, it discovered new break-ins at its Washington headquarters and other offices in eastern Asia, Reid said.
... Reid also complained the State Department's efforts to deal quietly with the break-in were disrupted by news reports. The Associated Press was first to reveal the intrusions.
"We were successful here until a newspaper article telegraphed what we were dealing with," Reid said.
[Since no one at State would ever leak information to the press, the AP must have been the hacker! QED Bob]
Ditto
No data stolen in 2006 computer intrusions, says Commerce Dept.
Jaikumar Vijayan
April 19, 2007 (Computerworld) Unknown intruders last year managed to infect 33 computers belonging to a bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) with data-stealing Trojans and other malware.
But the compromises were quickly detected and no information is believed to have been stolen, according to testimony presented today at a congressional subcommittee hearing on the extent to which federal networks and critical infrastructure have been compromised by foreign hackers. The hearing is being held by a subcommittee of the Committee on Homeland Security and is being chaired by Rep. James Langevin (D-R.I.).
Lawmakers expressed concern at those hearings that multiple U.S. agencies whose networks were hacked recently can't be sure they've fixed their vulnerabilities because of poor cybersecurity practices.
... According to Jarrell, the cyberintrusion affecting the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security systems was first noticed last July 13, when a BIS deputy under secretary reported being locked out of his computer. [Not the security software – good thing he wasn't on vacation! Bob]
... At the time its systems were compromised, BIS had in place all of the security requirements mandated by the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), Jarrell noted. However, even with those measures in place, the incidents could not have been prevented because the intruders took advantage of unpatched flaws to gain access, he said.
Does this make you feel better?
http://news.com.com/2100-1039_3-6177829.html?part=rss&tag=2547-1_3-0-5&subj=news
RIM offers explanation for massive outage
By Marguerite Reardon Story last modified Fri Apr 20 06:24:15 PDT 2007
Research In Motion finally gave some details late Thursday about what caused a severe outage of its popular BlackBerry e-mail service that began Tuesday evening and lasted until the wee hours of Wednesday morning.
The company said in a statement that it had ruled out security and capacity issues as a cause of the outage that left millions of so-called "CrackBerry" addicts without access to their e-mail for several hours. The company also said the incident was not caused by any hardware failure or core software issue.
Ruling out those causes, the company has "determined that the incident was triggered by the introduction of a new, noncritical system routine that was designed to provide better optimization of the system's cache."
... But despite previous testing, [previous does not equal adequate Bob] the new system routine produced an unexpected impact that set off a chain reaction triggering a series of interaction errors between the system's operational database and the cache.
After RIM isolated the database problem and tried unsuccessfully to fix the issue, it began its "failover" process to a backup system. But that also failed.
"Although the backup system and failover process had been repeatedly and successfully tested previously, the failover process did not fully perform to RIM's expectations in this situation and therefore caused further delay in restoring service and processing the resulting message queue," the company said in the statement.
RIM also said it has already identified several aspects of its testing, monitoring and recovery processes that it plans to enhance as a result of the incident. [Ya think? Bob]
Is this what we want? (Is it okay to send parents the bill...)
http://www-tech.mit.edu/V127/N19/vatech2.html
Privacy Laws Restrict Mental Illness Disclosure to Parents
By Tamar Lewin THE NEW YORK TIMES April 20, 2007
Federal privacy and antidiscrimination laws restrict how universities can deal with students who have mental health problems.
For the most part, universities cannot tell parents about their children's problems without the student's consent. They cannot release any information in a student's medical record without consent. And they cannot put students on involuntary medical leave, just because they develop a serious mental illness.
http://www.computerworld.com.au/index.php/id;988922035
HSBC customers outraged by bank's handling of security breach
Commercial interests favoured over privacy
Sandra Rossi 20/04/2007 13:03:30
HSBC Australia account holders are outraged that the bank didn't bother to contact a single customer in the wake of a serious security breach which exposed banking details, names and home addresses, as well as other financial information.
http://www.bjhc.co.uk/news/1/2007/n704005.htm
Full-name badges breach privacy
Nurses in Prince Edward Island, a province of Canada, have won the right not to wear name tags displaying their full names as the result of a recent ruling by Acting Privacy Commissioner, Karen Rose. She ruled that a nurse in a long-term care facility should not be required to display both her first and family names, because doing so could expose her to an immediate personal risk. [Perhaps they could wear those surgical masks too! Bob]
http://www.bjhc.co.uk/news/1/2007/n704006.htm
GPs could sue over breach of a dead patient’s confidence
The Information Commissioner has upheld a decision made by County Durham NHS Primary Care Trust not to release records of a deceased patient, on the grounds that the patient’s GP could sue for damages.
It's simple economics. There's a consumer born every minute...
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/04/securitymatters_0419
Security Matters Commentary by Bruce Schneier
How Security Companies Sucker Us With Lemons
04.19.07 | 2:00 AM
More than a year ago, I wrote about the increasing risks of data loss because more and more data fits in smaller and smaller packages. Today I use a 4-GB USB memory stick for backup while I am traveling. I like the convenience, but if I lose the tiny thing I risk all my data.
Encryption is the obvious solution for this problem -- I use PGPdisk -- but Secustick sounds even better: It automatically erases itself after a set number of bad password attempts. The company makes a bunch of other impressive claims: The product was commissioned, and eventually approved, by the French intelligence service; it is used by many militaries and banks; its technology is revolutionary.
Unfortunately, the only impressive aspect of Secustick is its hubris, which was revealed when Tweakers.net completely broke its security. There's no data self-destruct feature. The password protection can easily be bypassed. The data isn't even encrypted. As a secure storage device, Secustick is pretty useless.
On the surface, this is just another snake-oil security story. But there's a deeper question: Why are there so many bad security products out there? It's not just that designing good security is hard -- although it is -- and it's not just that anyone can design a security product that he himself cannot break. Why do mediocre security products beat the good ones in the marketplace?
In 1970, American economist George Akerlof wrote a paper called "The Market for 'Lemons'" (abstract and article for pay here), which established asymmetrical information theory. He eventually won a Nobel Prize for his work, which looks at markets where the seller knows a lot more about the product than the buyer.
Akerlof illustrated his ideas with a used car market. A used car market includes both good cars and lousy ones (lemons). The seller knows which is which, but the buyer can't tell the difference -- at least until he's made his purchase. I'll spare you the math, but what ends up happening is that the buyer bases his purchase price on the value of a used car of average quality.
This means that the best cars don't get sold; their prices are too high. Which means that the owners of these best cars don't put their cars on the market. And then this starts spiraling. The removal of the good cars from the market reduces the average price buyers are willing to pay, and then the very good cars no longer sell, and disappear from the market. And then the good cars, and so on until only the lemons are left.
In a market where the seller has more information about the product than the buyer, bad products can drive the good ones out of the market.
The computer security market has a lot of the same characteristics of Akerlof's lemons market. Take the market for encrypted USB memory sticks. Several companies make encrypted USB drives -- Kingston Technology sent me one in the mail a few days ago -- but even I couldn't tell you if Kingston's offering is better than Secustick. Or if it's better than any other encrypted USB drives. They use the same encryption algorithms. They make the same security claims. And if I can't tell the difference, most consumers won't be able to either.
Of course, it's more expensive to make an actually secure USB drive. Good security design takes time, and necessarily means limiting functionality. Good security testing takes even more time, especially if the product is any good. This means the less-secure product will be cheaper, sooner to market and have more features. In this market, the more-secure USB drive is going to lose out.
I see this kind of thing happening over and over in computer security. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were more than a hundred competing firewall products. The few that "won" weren't the most secure firewalls; they were the ones that were easy to set up, easy to use and didn't annoy users too much. Because buyers couldn't base their buying decision on the relative security merits, they based them on these other criteria. The intrusion detection system, or IDS, market evolved the same way, and before that the antivirus market. The few products that succeeded weren't the most secure, because buyers couldn't tell the difference.
How do you solve this? You need what economists call a "signal," a way for buyers to tell the difference. Warrantees are a common signal. Alternatively, an independent auto mechanic can tell good cars from lemons, and a buyer can hire his expertise. The Secustick story demonstrates this. If there is a consumer advocate group that has the expertise to evaluate different products, then the lemons can be exposed.
Secustick, for one, seems to have been withdrawn from sale.
But security testing is both expensive and slow, and it just isn't possible for an independent lab to test everything. Unfortunately, the exposure of Secustick is an exception. It was a simple product, and easily exposed once someone bothered to look. A complex software product -- a firewall, an IDS -- is very hard to test well. And, of course, by the time you have tested it, the vendor has a new version on the market.
In reality, we have to rely on a variety of mediocre signals to differentiate the good security products from the bad. Standardization is one signal. The widely used AES encryption standard has reduced, although not eliminated, the number of lousy encryption algorithms on the market. Reputation is a more common signal; we choose security products based on the reputation of the company selling them, the reputation of some security wizard associated with them, magazine reviews, recommendations from colleagues or general buzz in the media.
All these signals have their problems. Even product reviews, which should be as comprehensive as the Tweakers' Secustick review, rarely are. Many firewall comparison reviews focus on things the reviewers can easily measure, like packets per second, rather than how secure the products are. In IDS comparisons, you can find the same bogus "number of signatures" comparison. Buyers lap that stuff up; in the absence of deep understanding, they happily accept shallow data.
With so many mediocre security products on the market, and the difficulty of coming up with a strong quality signal, vendors don't have strong incentives to invest in developing good products. And the vendors that do tend to die a quiet and lonely death.
Poorly argued?
http://techdirt.com/articles/20070419/125026.shtml
Saying You Have An Open WiFi AP May Not Help You Beat Child Porn Charges
from the what-would-matlock-do dept
CNet had a slightly bizarre story Wednesday as part of their regular series looking at the intersection of technology and the judicial system. A federal appeals court recently rejected the appeal of a Texas man convicted on child-porn charges, who'd argued that the fact that he had an open WiFi access point that anybody could access made the original search warrant for his home invalid. There are some strange parts to this tale. The case began when a woman in New York reported getting some child porn sent to her over Yahoo Messenger, and the FBI traced the sender back to an IP address from Time Warner Cable in Austin, Texas. The ISP gave up the name on the account using that IP, and a search warrant for the account holder's house was executed, and child porn was found in the account holder's part of the house. The man argued that the warrant should be invalid because the open AP meant one of his roommates or somebody outside the house could have sent the images that sparked the investigation -- and indeed, the Yahoo account was registered under the name "Mr. Rob Ram", and one of the guy's roommates was named Robert Ramos.
While there would seem to be room for some doubt in all of this, the appeals court rightly noted that the level of proof needed for a warrant is much lower than that needed for a conviction, and the fact that child porn was sent from his IP is a reasonable basis to issue the search warrant. This case would appear to have some slight parallels to some of the RIAA's cases against file-sharers, where it simply goes after whoever holds the ISP account without making any effort to identify the actual copyright infringer. This idea of secondary liability isn't standing up for the RIAA, but it's a little different than what's being argued here. The charges against this man weren't based on what was sent from his ISP account; rather the FBI used that as the basis for an investigation that resulted in charges based on materials found in the guy's house. The RIAA, of course, doesn't really bother so much with the investigation part, preferring instead just to hit anybody they can with a lawsuit. One more twist to the child porn case: the guy entered a guilty plea to the charges, pending the outcome of this appeal. Arguing that you shouldn't have been caught, and not that you didn't do it, probably doesn't help your case much.
Dumb argument?
http://techdirt.com/articles/20070419/170440.shtml
SCO Head Wants To Ban Public WiFi To Stop Porn
from the that'll-help dept
Last month, Utah's governor signed a resolution urging Congress to pass a law that would set up "family" and "adult" channels on the internet as a way to keep kids from seeing boobies. The resolution was based on the work of a group called CP80, which advocates mandating porn be put on its own port, and is headed by the chairman of everybody's favorite tech company, the SCO Group, Ralph Yarro. Now, Yarro's told a Utah legislative committee that open WiFi networks should be banned, and all WiFi networks should have filtering software to keep out porn, or be password-protected, so that if any porn makes its way onto a minor's computer, the network provider can be fined. That seems little odd, like fining the state's transportation department for building roads that people might drive on to go buy porn somewhere. But the suggestions didn't stop there: a BYU law professor says the state should circumvent the constitution not by forcing ISPs to block porn, but rather by giving tax incentives to those that do. One state senator says that the key is "a statewide education program so citizens can learn about the real problem with the uncontrolled porn in our society, mainly coming through the Internet." We'd imagine that advertising the availability of porn on the internet would run counter to these people's goals, but apparently not.
Tools & Techniques: Understand what can be done...
http://searchengineland.com/070419-181618.php
Google Search History Expands, Becomes Web History
Google's Search History feature, which was switched on as a default option for many Google searchers in February, has now been renamed Web History to reflect how it has expanded to track what Google users do as the surf the web. It's a huge move for Google and raises anew privacy issues. Below, a detailed look at how the system works, how to pause or delete logging if you want, the impact on search results and more.
Tools & Techniques (Never be less well armed than your neighborhood hacker...)
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,2115879,00.asp?kc=EWRSS03119TX1K0000594
Researcher: Tools Will Help Personalize ID Theft by 2010
April 19, 2007 By Lisa Vaas
VANCOUVER, British Columbia—Hackers with scrounged-up data ask the same question as dogs who've caught the school bus: What do we do with it now?
Roelof Temmingh has the answer, at least for rogue hackers, in the form of a framework that makes identity theft a much easier proposition. The framework, which is in the early stages of development, is called Evolution. Temmingh, a security expert who's authored well-known security testing applications such as Wikto and CrowBar, demonstrated Evolution during his opening presentation here at the CanSecWest security
... The framework's genius lies in transforming one type of information to another. Evolution can transform a domain into an e-mail address or telephone number, or both (through the Whois domain name lookup service), to related DNS names, to IPs, to a Web site, to e-mail addresses (again, via Whois), to telephone numbers, to geographic locations, to alternative e-mail addresses, to related telephone numbers, to co-hosted sites with the same IP, and so on.
... "Real criminals don't write buffer overflows," he said. "They follow the route of least resistance."
Mainstream criminals tend to lag behind technological advance, he said. For example, phishing attacks were known about as far back as 1995. The question is, what will be on criminals' minds in 2010? Temmingh believes that the Internet's darker elements will be using tools "something close to" what he's demonstrated in Evolution: a framework that can execute personalized identity theft with scraps of information.
"[Criminals] will be able to have tools to merge this information together to manipulate outcome of certain events," Temmingh said.
Tools & Techniques: This seems to be an increasingly common trick...
http://www.insidebayarea.com/dailyreview/localnews/ci_5711749
Identity theft probe expands to Alameda
PIN pads in Albertsons stores were tampered with to allow card numbers to be stolen
By Alejandro Alfonso, STAFF WRITER Article Last Updated: 04/20/2007 03:07:07 AM PDT
SAN LORENZO — The investigation into an identity theft ring that began after a PIN pad was tampered with at an Albertsons supermarket in San Lorenzo has broadened to include another Albertsons store in Alameda and the number of reported victims has topped 100 people who together lost about $70,000, according to the Alameda County Sheriff's Office.
Investigators now believe a sophisticated group of thieves replaced an Electric Funds Transfer unit, or PIN pad, at the Albertsons stores with a nearly identical pad that would steal customer's account information and PIN numbers, sheriff's Detective Greg Swetnam said.
I like it! Why you ask? See the next article...
http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7007075062
Hackers Invited To Break Into Philippine Internet Voting System
April 17, 2007 7:26 p.m. EST Geoffrey Ramos - All Headline News Staff Writer
Manila, Philippines (AHN) - Local and foreign computer hackers will be tapped to try and break into an Internet-based voting system that will be pilot tested by the country's Commission on Elections (Comelec) starting July 10.
http://www.govtech.net/magazine/story.php?id=105054
Testimony Released on Electronic Voting Machines
April 19, 2007 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office yesterday released a transcript of testimony on electronic voting machines. Titled All Levels of Government Are Needed to Address Electronic Voting System Challenges -- by Randolph C. Hite, director of information technology architecture and systems -- said, in part: "The integrity of voting systems -- which is but one variable in a successful election process equation -- depends on effective system life cycle management, which includes systems definition, development, acquisition, operations, testing and management. It also depends on measuring actual voting system performance in terms of security, reliability, ease of use and cost effectiveness, so that any needed corrective actions can be taken. Unless voting systems are properly managed throughout their life cycle, this one facet of the election process can significantly undermine the integrity of the whole.
"Election officials, computer security experts, citizen advocacy groups, and others have raised significant concerns about the security and reliability of electronic voting systems," continued Hite, "citing vague or incomplete standards, weak security controls, system design flaws, incorrect system configuration, poor security management and inadequate security testing, among other issues. Many of these security and reliability concerns are legitimate and thus merit the combined and focused attention of federal, state, and local authorities responsible for election administration."
What a great way to begin your legal career!
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1176973462175
EarthLink Subpoenaed for Customer Records When Anonymous Web Posting Reveals Bar Questions
By R. Robin McDonald Fulton County Daily Report 04-20-2007
The National Conference of Bar Examiners is hunting for the anonymous person who published 41 questions from the 2006 Multistate Bar Examination on an Internet blog within hours of taking the exam last year.
The conference -- which develops and distributes the national portion of the biannual bar exam, called the MBE -- asserts in federal court documents that whoever posted the questions on tabandbrandy.blogspot.com infringed the MBE copyright and disregarded instructions that prohibit exam-takers from disclosing exam questions and answers.
... The NCBE staff routinely monitors Web sites and blogs before and after the exam and occasionally has found "smatterings of [exam] questions," she said. "What prompted us to action in this particular case was the sheer volume and audacity of the posting."
... Moeser said that EarthLink lawyers responded Wednesday to the subpoena request but did not provide the identity or e-mail of the individual who posted the bar questions on July 26, 2006.
"At this stage, it's not clear they have retained records back to when the posting occurred," she said.
For jurisdiction shoppers?
http://www.bespacific.com/mt/archives/014607.html
April 19, 2007
Global Legal Information Network Now Searchable Via World Legal Information Institute
"The Global Legal Information Network (GLIN) of the United States Law
Library of Congress is now searchable via WorldLII, the World Legal Information Institute. GLIN Abstracts provides databases from 40 countries: Angola - Argentina - Belize - Bolivia - Brazil - Canada - Cape Verde - Chile - Colombia - Congo - Costa Rica - Cuba - Dominican Republic - Ecuador - El Salvador - Guatemala - Haiti - Honduras - Kuwait - Mali - Mauritania - Mexico -Mozambique - Nicaragua - Pakistan - Panama - Paraguay - Peru -Philippines - Portugal - Romania - Russia - Saudi Arabia - South Korea - Spain - Taiwan - Tunisia - United States - Uruguay - Venezuela. Approximately half of the the 139,622 abstracts in GLIN provide links to the full texts of the legislation, court decisions and other documents that are abstracted." [Graham Greenleaf, Professor of Law Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales]
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