Saturday, August 08, 2026

Can you think of a few other systems that don’t need to be accessible from Iran?

https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/08/07/water-system-controllers-dont-belong-on-the-internet-says-ex-nsa-chief-after-suspected-iran-attacks/5285070

Water system controllers don't belong on the internet, says ex-NSA chief after suspected Iran attacks





More significant that I thought.

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/08/world/europe/russia-wildberries-tatyana-kim.html?unlocked_article_code=1.31A.lizT.19wq63dNxZ_O&smid=url-share

She Is Russia’s Richest Woman. Her Business Empire Is Going Up in Flames.

… Wildberries has lost up to one-third of its warehouse space and as much as 480 billion rubles’ worth of goods ($5.9 billion) in the Ukrainian attacks, according to Moscow-based Data Insight, an e-commerce consultancy.

Wildberries “has almost run out of its biggest warehouses,” said Sergei Semko, an analyst at Data Insight. “Every single day one warehouse after another is getting methodically destroyed,” he added.





So, the president is the one negotiating with Trump?

https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/irans-president-difficult-contact-supreme-leader-mojtaba-khamenei-rcna591110

Iran’s president says it’s ‘very difficult’ to contact absent Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei

Khamenei hasn’t been seen publicly since taking up the role, most notably failing to attend his own father’s public funeral proceedings in Tehran last month.



(Related) Who is shaping it now?

https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/8/3/who-will-shape-post-war-iran

Who will shape post-war Iran?

… On one side is the security establishment, which includes the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its volunteer paramilitary, the Basij; the regular army, or Artesh, with its ground, air, naval and air-defence forces; and intelligence and internal-security bodies. The IRGC remains the most politically influential part of this architecture, but Iran’s security capacity is distributed across several institutions and chains of command.

… Then there is the elected government. President Masoud Pezeshkian controls the ministries that manage the economy, reconstruction and diplomacy, but not the armed forces or the final decisions on war and national security. His government, therefore, carries much of the burden of keeping the country functioning and negotiating abroad while operating within security limits set through the supreme leader and the Supreme National Security Council.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf occupies a different position. He has access to both civilian and military networks. That has made him important in building agreement around sensitive files, including negotiations. His influence comes from being able to move between institutions that do not always share the same priorities and turn military red lines into positions the government can implement.



(Related) Yet another view… (Including a chart)

https://www.cnbc.com/2026/08/01/iran-ceasefire-power-structure.html

Iran’s overlapping power centers make ending the war more complicated

… Whenever negotiations resume, Iran’s opaque power structure — spanning the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guards, civilian government, commanders and other groups — will shape not only what is agreed, but whether any deal can be enforced.



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