Automating legal stuff…
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5309575
Generative Misinterpretation
In a series of provocative experiments, a loose group of scholars, lawyers, and judges has endorsed generative interpretation: asking large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and Claude to resolve interpretive issues from actual cases. With varying degrees of confidence, they argue that LLMs are (or will soon be) able to assist-or even replace-judges in performing interpretive tasks like determining the meaning of a term in a contract or statute. A few go even further and argue for using LLMs to decide entire cases and to generate opinions supporting those decisions.
We respectfully dissent. In this Article, we show that LLMs are not yet fit for purpose for use in judicial chambers. Generative interpretation, like all empirical methods, must bridge two gaps to be useful and legitimate. The first is a reliability gap: are its methods consistent and reproducible enough to be trusted in high-stakes, real-world settings? Unfortunately, as we show, LLM proponents' experimental results are brittle and frequently arbitrary. The second is an epistemic gap: do these methods measure what they purport to? Here, LLM proponents have pointed to (1) LLMs' training processes on large datasets, (2) empirical measures of LLM outputs, (3) the rhetorical persuasiveness of those outputs, and (4) the assumed predictability of algorithmic methods. We show, however, that all of these justifications rest on unstated and faulty premises about the nature of LLMs and the nature of judging.
The superficial fluency of LLM-generated text conceals fundamental gaps between what these models are currently capable of and what legal interpretation requires to be methodologically and socially legitimate. Put simply, any human or computer can put words on a page, but it takes something more to turn those words into a legitimate act of legal interpretation. LLM proponents do not yet have a plausible story of what that "something more" comprises.
Not to mention “bunker busters.”
https://thecrsss.com/index.php/Journal/article/view/611
Revisiting the Geneva Conventions: Are the Four Core Conventions Sufficient for 21st Century Warfare?
The Geneva Conventions of 1949, along with their Additional Protocols, form the foundation of international humanitarian law IHL governing armed conflict. However, the evolution of warfare in the 21st century characterized by cyber operations, autonomous weapons, urban warfare, and the involvement of non-state actors has raised serious questions about the adequacy of these core legal instruments. This study critically examines whether the four Geneva Conventions remain sufficient to address the humanitarian and legal challenges posed by modern warfare. Using a doctrinal legal research methodology, the study analyses treaty texts, customary international law, scholarly commentary, and case studies involving emerging conflict scenarios. It finds that while the Geneva Conventions continue to provide essential humanitarian safeguards, they lack specificity in addressing new forms of warfare, particularly in domains such as cyberspace and artificial intelligence. The article concludes that without reinterpretation or the adoption of supplementary legal frameworks, the protective regime of IHL may fall short in ensuring civilian protection and accountability in future conflicts. Thus, the study recommends a proactive revaluation of the Conventions through dynamic interpretation, the development of new protocols, and enhanced international cooperation. The Geneva Conventions, widely regarded as the cornerstone of IHL, have guided the conduct of war and the protection of victims since their adoption in 1949. However, the evolution of warfare in the 21st century marked by cyber conflicts, autonomous weapons systems, and non-state actors has challenged the efficacy and comprehensiveness of these treaties. This article critically examines the relevance and sufficiency of the four Geneva Conventions in regulating modern armed conflicts. It contends that while the Conventions remain foundational, significant legal and normative gaps necessitate either expansive reinterpretation or supplementary legal instruments to ensure continued humanitarian protection.
