To err is human. To hallucinate is AI?

https://www.bespacific.com/generative-artificial-intelligence-and-copyright-law-4/

Generative Artificial Intelligence and Copyright Law

Generative Artificial Intelligence and Copyright Law CRS Legal Sidebar – LSB10922, 7/18/25 – “Innovations in artificial intelligence (AI) have raised several new questions in the field of copyright law.  Generative AI programs—such as Open AI’s DALL-E and ChatGPT programs, Stability AI’s Stable Diffusion program, and Midjourney’s self-titled program—are able to generate new images, texts, and other content (or “outputs”) in response to a user’s textual or other prompts. Generative AI programs are trained to create such outputs partly by exposing them to large quantities of existing writings, photos, paintings, or other works. This Legal Sidebar explores questions that courts and the U.S. Copyright Office have confronted regarding whether generative AI outputs may be copyrighted as well as whether training and using generative AI programs may infringe copyrights in other works. Other CRS Legal Sidebars explore questions AI raises in the intellectual property fields of patents and the right of publicity…”

No encryption no privacy.

https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol108/iss2/5/

Encryption Backdoors and the Fourth Amendment

The National Security Agency (NSA) reportedly paid and pressured technology companies to trick their customers into using vulnerable encryption products. This Article examines whether any of three theories removed the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that this be reasonable. The first is that a challenge to the encryption backdoor might fail for want of a search or seizure. The Article rejects this both because the Amendment reaches some vulnerabilities apart from the searches and seizures they enable and because the creation of this vulnerability was itself a search or seizure. The second is that the role of the technology companies might have brought this backdoor within the private-search doctrine. The Article criticizes the doctrine— particularly its origins in Burdeau v. McDowell—and argues that if it ever should apply, it should not here. The last is that the customers might have waived their Fourth Amendment rights under the third-party doctrine. The Article rejects this both because the customers were not on notice of the backdoor and because historical understandings of the Amendment would not have tolerated it. The Article concludes that none of these theories removed the Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.